

McCulloch v. Maryland (1819)

In 1791, the first Bank of the United States was established to serve as a central bank for the country. It was a place for storing government funds, collecting taxes, and issuing sound currency. At the time it was created, the government was in its infancy and there was a great deal of debate over exactly how much power the national government should have. Some people, such as Alexander Hamilton, argued for the supremacy of the national government and a loose interpretation of its powers, which would include the ability to establish a bank. Others, such as Thomas Jefferson, advocated states' rights, limited government, and a stricter interpretation of the national government's powers under the Constitution and, therefore, no bank. While Jefferson was President, the Bank's charter was not renewed. After the War of 1812, President James Madison determined that the country could utilize the services of a national bank to help fulfill its powers listed in link to Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 of the Constitution. In response to his suggestion, Congress proposed a Second Bank of the United States in 1816.



President Madison approved the charter and branches were established throughout the United States. Many states opposed opening branches of this bank within their boundaries for several reasons. First, the Bank of the United States competed with their own banks. Second, the states found many of the managers of the Bank of the United States to be corrupt. Third, the states felt that the federal government was exerting too much power over them by attempting to curtail the state practice of issuing more paper money than they were able to redeem on demand.

One state opposed to the Bank of the United States was Maryland. In an attempt to drive the Baltimore branch of the Bank of the United States out of business, the Maryland State Legislature required that all banks chartered outside of Maryland pay an annual tax of \$15,000. There was a \$500 penalty for each violation of this statute. James McCulloch, cashier of the Baltimore branch of the Bank of the United States, refused to pay the tax.

The State of Maryland took him to court, arguing that because Maryland was a sovereign state, it had the authority to tax businesses within its border, and that because the Bank of the United States was one such business, it had to pay the tax. Luther Martin, one of the attorneys for Maryland, reasoned that because the federal government had the authority to regulate state banks, Maryland could do the same to federal banks. Besides, he argued, the Constitution does not give Congress the power to establish a Bank of the United States. McCulloch was convicted by a Maryland court of violating the tax statute and was fined \$2,500.

McCulloch appealed the decision to the Maryland Court of Appeals. His attorneys, who included Daniel Webster, asserted that the establishment of a national bank was a "necessary and proper" function of the Congress. Webster stated that many powers of the government are implied rather than specifically stated in the Constitution. Furthermore, he argued, Maryland did not have the authority to levy the tax, because doing so interfered with the workings of the federal government.

After the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the original decision against McCulloch, he appealed again. The case was heard by the Supreme Court of the United States, then headed by Chief Justice John Marshall.

In *McCulloch v. Maryland* (1819) the Supreme Court ruled that Congress had implied powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution to create the Second Bank of the United States and that the state of Maryland lacked the power to tax the Bank. Arguably Chief Justice John Marshall's finest opinion, *McCulloch* not only gave Congress broad discretionary power to implement the enumerated powers, but also repudiated, in ringing language, the radical states' rights arguments presented by counsel for Maryland.

In a unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice Marshall, the Court ruled that the Bank of the United States was constitutional and that the Maryland tax was unconstitutional. Concerning the power of Congress to charter a bank, the Court turned to the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I, Section 8, which expressly grants Congress the power to pass laws "necessary and proper" for the execution of its "enumerated powers." The enumerated powers of Congress include the power to regulate interstate commerce, collect taxes, and borrow money. Said the Court famously, "let the ends be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adopted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." In other words, because the creation of the Bank was appropriately related to Congress's legitimate power to tax, borrow, and regulate interstate commerce, the Bank was constitutional under the Necessary and Proper Clause.

Second, the Court ruled that Maryland lacked the power to tax the Bank because, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution, the laws of the United States trump conflicting state laws. As Marshall put it, "the government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action, and its laws, when made in pursuance of the constitution, form the supreme law of the land." Because "the power to tax is the power to destroy," Maryland was unconstitutionally undermining the superior laws and institutions of the United States.


Finally, the Court held that the "sovereignty" (political authority) of the Union lies with the people of the United States, not with the individual states that comprise it. The United States, not a simple alliance of states, is a nation of "constitutional sovereignty" with its authority resting exclusively with "the people" who created and are governed by the Constitution. To the Court, "the government of the Union is a government of the people; it emanates from them; its powers are granted by them; and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit." Maryland's tax, however, violated constitutional sovereignty because it acted as a levy against all the people in the United States by a state accountable to only some of the people.

If *Marbury v. Madison* (1803) "promised" that the Supreme Court would exercise great authority in shaping the laws of the land, *McCulloch v. Maryland* fulfilled that promise for the first time. Arguably no other decision has so profoundly defined national power. In one case, the Court expanded Congress' powers to include those implied by the Constitution, established the inferior status of the states in relation to the Union, and set the constitutional sovereignty of the federal government. *McCulloch* remains today fundamental and binding bedrock of American constitutional law.

The Decision: while the Constitution doesn't outright SAY the government has the right to create a bank, it IMPLIES it.



"[The Congress shall have Power] . . . [t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States." - Article I, Section 8 of the US Constitution



Gibbons v. Ogden (1824)- Regulation of Interstate Commerce

Background of the Case

In 1798 the New York legislature gave Robert Fulton a monopoly for steamboat navigation in New York. In 1811 Fulton's partner, Robert Livingston, assigned to Aaron Ogden an exclusive license to run a ferry service on the Hudson River between New York and New Jersey—a very profitable business. Seeking to take advantage of this flourishing trade, a competitor, Thomas Gibbons, secured a license from the federal government to operate a ferry between Elizabethtown, New Jersey, and New York City. Claiming that his monopoly rights were being infringed, Ogden obtained an injunction in a New York state court forbidding Gibbons' boat from docking in New York. (An injunction is an order by a court prohibiting a person or a group from carrying out a specific action.) Gibbons appealed the state court's decision to the United States Supreme Court.

Constitutional Issues

The Constitution did not make clear what was meant by interstate commerce or the extent to which it could be regulated. At the time of this case in 1824, New York had closed its ports to vessels not owned or licensed by a monopoly chartered by the state. In retaliation, other states passed similar laws that limited access to their ports. The United States attorney maintained, that the country faced a commercial “civil war.” In the absence of a clear statement of what is meant by interstate commerce, how did the federal government have the power to intervene?

The *Gibbons v. Ogden* case presented the Supreme Court with the first opportunity to consider the ramifications of the commerce clause contained in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. This clause gave Congress the power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.” Several constitutional questions were involved in the case, revolving around an interpretation of the commerce clause:

The Supreme Court's Decision

The Court held in Gibbons' favor. Chief Justice John Marshall wrote that commerce “describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse. The mind can scarcely conceive a system for regulating commerce between nations which shall exclude navigation.

Case Analysis

Marshall applied the same reasoning to commerce between states. In fact, he noted, the United States government had always regulated navigation. “All America understands,” he wrote, “and has uniformly understood the word ‘commerce’ to comprehend navigation . . .” Thus the Court held that “a power to regulate navigation is expressly granted as if that term had been added to the word ‘commerce.’ ”

Marshall now turned to the meaning of “among,” as in “among the several states.” He reasoned that since “among” means “intermingled with,” “commerce among the states cannot stop at the external boundary line of each state but may be introduced into the interior.” Congress had no power over commerce which was confined to one state alone, but that power was in full force as soon as a state's boundary line had been crossed. And the power to regulate must necessarily follow any commerce in question right across those boundaries.”

Marshall concluded that, like other congressional powers, the power to regulate commerce is unlimited so long as it is applied to objects specified in the Constitution. The case also raised the question as to Congress's power to regulate is exclusive. If it is, then a state would be prevented from making its own commerce regulations. Marshall chose not to resolve this question. Instead, he wrote that in the *Gibbons* case there was a conflict between the state's law and a federal statute. “In every such case, the act of Congress . . . is supreme; and the law of the state. . . must yield to it.” Gibbons' right to operate ferry service in competition with Ogden was therefore upheld.

By broadening the meaning of interstate commerce, Marshall laid the groundwork for including not only such clearly interstate activities as railroads and pipelines, but also the minimum wage regulation and prohibition of child labor. Robert Jackson, a Supreme Court justice who served in the mid 1900s, was thus correct when he declared, “Chief Justice Marshall described the federal commerce power with a breadth never exceeded.”